[Moral Science; A Compendium of Ethics by Alexander Bain]@TWC D-Link book
Moral Science; A Compendium of Ethics

CHAPTER III
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That each person should say what is, instead of what is not, may well seem a primitive and natural impulse.

In circumstances of perfect indifference, this would be the obvious and usual course of conduct; being, like the straight line, the shortest distance between two points.

Let a motive arise, however, in favour of the lie, and there is nothing to insure the truth.

Reference must be made to other parts of the mind, from which counter-motives may be furnished; and the intuition in favour of Truth, not being able to support itself, has to repose on the general foundation of all virtue, the instituted recognition of the claims of others.
8.

Fourthly, Intuition is incapable of settling the debated questions of Practical Morality.
If we recall some of the great questions of practical life that have divided the opinions of mankind, we shall find that mere Intuition is helpless to decide them.
The toleration of heretical opinions has been a greatly contested point.


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