Fifthly, It is practicable to analyze or resolve the Moral Faculty; and, in so doing, to explain, both its peculiar property, and the similarity of moral judgments so far as existing among men.
We begin, by estimating the operation of (1) Prudence.

(2) Sympathy, and (3) the Emotions generally.
The inducements to perform a moral act, as, for example, the fulfilling of a bargain,--are plainly seen to be of various kinds.
(1) Prudence, or Self-interest, has obviously much to do with the moral conduct.

Postponing for the present the consideration of Punishment, which is one mode of appeal to the prudential regards, we can trace the workings of self-interest on many occasions wherein men act right.

To fulfil a bargain is, in the great majority of cases, for the advantage of the agent; if he fails to perform his part, others may do the same to him.
Our self-interest may look still farther.

We may readily discover that if we set an example of injustice, it may be taken up and repeated to such a degree that we can count upon nothing; social security comes to an end, and individual existence, even if possible, would cease to be desirable.
A yet higher view of self-interest informs us, that by performing all our obligations to our fellows, we not only attain reciprocal performance, but generate mutual affections and sympathies, which greatly augment the happiness of life.
(2) Sympathy, or Fellow-feeling, the source of our disinterested actions, must next be taken into the account.