July 11, Adams made his formal offer to sign a convention and communicated a draft of it on the thirteenth.
On the day intervening, the twelfth, Russell took a very important step indicative of his sincerity throughout, of his lack of any ulterior motive, and of his anxiety to carry through the negotiation with no resulting irritations or complications with the United States.

He recalled his instructions to Lyons about communicating with the Confederacy, stating that in any case he had never intended that Lyons should act without first officially notifying Seward.

This recall was now made, he wrote, because to go on might "create fresh irritation without any adequate result," but if in the meantime Lyons had already started negotiations with the South he might "proceed in them to the end[303]." Having taken this step in the hope that it might avert friction with the United States, Russell, now distinctly eager to secure American adherence to the Declaration in full, was ready to conclude the convention at once.

The warnings received from many sources did not dismay him.

He probably thought that no actual difficulties would ensue, believing that the South would not venture to continue privateering.
Even if France were disinclined to make a convention he appears to have been ready for signature by Great Britain alone, for on July 15 he telegraphed Cowley, "I conclude there can be no objection to my signing a Convention with the U.S.Minister giving the adherence of the U.S.