A demand upon them to aid in suppressing privateering might indeed then be used as an argument, but the object was not privateering in itself; that object was the recall of the recognition of Southern belligerency.

In the end he simply could not agree to the limiting declaration for it would have constituted an acknowledgment by the United States itself of the existence of a state of war.
In all of this Adams, seemingly, had no share.

He acted on the simple and straightforward theory that the United States, pursuing a conciliatory policy, was now offering to adhere to international rules advocated by all the maritime powers.

As a result he felt both personally and patriotically aggrieved that suspicion was directed toward the American overtures[315].

For him the failure of the negotiation had temporarily, at least, an unfortunate result: "So far as the assumed friendliness of Earl Russell to the United States was concerned, the scales had fallen from his eyes.