This was clear to Lyons who, though against such recognition, had understood the drift, if Schleiden is to be trusted, of Ministerial opinion.

Schleiden reported on December 31 that Lyons had expressed to him much pleasure at the peaceful conclusion of the _Trent_ affair, and had added, "England will be too generous not to postpone the recognition of the independence of the South as long as possible after this experience[498]." But the _Trent_ operated like a thunder-storm to clear the atmosphere.

It brought out plainly the practical difficulties and dangers, at least as regards Canada, of a war with America; it resulted in a weakening of the conviction that Seward was unfriendly; it produced from the British public an even greater expression of relief, when the incident was closed, than of anger when it occurred; and it created in a section of that public a fixed belief, shared by at least one member of the Cabinet, that the issue in America was that of slavery, in support of which England could not possibly take a stand.
This did not mean that the British Government, nor any large section of the public, believed the North could conquer the South.

But it did indicate a renewed vigour for the policy of neutrality and a determination not to get into war with America.

Adams wrote to Seward, "I am inclined to believe that the happening of the affair of the _Trent_ just when it did, with just the issue that it had, was rather opportune than otherwise[499]." Hotze, the confidential agent of the Confederacy in London, stated, "the _Trent_ affair has done us incalculable injury," Russell is now "an avowed enemy of our nationality[500]." Hotze was over-gloomy, but Russell himself declared to Lyons: "At all events I am heart and soul a neutral ...