Both of them think that as he went on, the difficulties of the work grew upon him, and caused alterations in his plans, and we are reminded that "there is no didactic exposition of his method in the whole of his writings," and that "this has not been sufficiently remarked by those who have spoken of his philosophy." In the first place, the kind of intellectual instrument which he proposed to construct was a mistake.

His great object was to place the human mind "on a level with things and nature" (_ut faciamus intellectum humanum rebus et naturae parem_), and this could only be done by a revolution in methods.

The ancients had all that genius could do for man; but it was a matter, he said, not of the strength and fleetness of the running, but of the rightness of the way.

It was a new method, absolutely different from anything known, which he proposed to the world, and which should lead men to knowledge, with the certainty and with the impartial facility of a high-road.

The Induction which he imagined to himself as the contrast to all that had yet been tried was to have two qualities.