The former was directly to oppose the march of Napoleon's main army, while the smaller Russian force was to operate on its flanks and rear.

Such a plan could only have succeeded in the good old times when war was conducted according to ceremonious etiquette; it courted destruction from Napoleon.

At Vilna the Emperor directed the movements that were to ensnare Bagration.

Already he had urged on the march of Davoust, who was to circle round from the north, and the advance of Jerome Bonaparte's Westphalians, who were bidden to hurry on eastwards from the town of Grodno on the Upper Niemen.

Their convergence would drive Bagration into the almost trackless marshes of the Pripet, whence his force would emerge, if at all, as helpless units.
Such was Napoleon's plan, and it would have succeeded but for a miscalculation in the time needed for Jerome's march.