But the ability to commit crime cannot be referred to the good; therefore it is not a thing to be desired.

And yet all power is desirable; it is clear, then, that ability to do evil is not power.

From all which considerations appeareth the power of the good, and the indubitable weakness of the bad, and it is clear that Plato's judgment was true; the wise alone are able to do what they would, while the wicked follow their own hearts' lust, but can _not_ accomplish what they would.

For they go on in their wilfulness fancying they will attain what they wish for in the paths of delight; but they are very far from its attainment, since shameful deeds lead not to happiness.' FOOTNOTES: [K] The paradoxes in this chapter and chapter iv.

are taken from Plato's 'Gorgias.' See Jowett, vol.ii., pp.