This decision of the English Cabinet was perfectly well known to us, but we knew still better that the general interests of Europe and the particular interests of England were so bound up in our dispute with Russia that, in spite of all the Declarations of the English Cabinet, it appeared to us to be absolutely impossible for her to avoid interfering sooner or later in this Eastern dispute.

This profound belief, added to the reasons we have mentioned, was one of the principal factors of our contest with Russia[124].
[Footnote 124: See, too, the official report of our pro-Turkish Ambassador at Constantinople, Mr.Layard (May 30, 1877), as to the difficulty of our keeping out of the war in its final stages (Parl.
Papers, Turkey, No.

26 (1877), p.

52).] It appears, then, that the action of the British Government in the spring and summer of 1876, and the well-known desire of the Prime Minister to intervene in favour of Turkey, must have contributed to the Sultan's decision to court the risks of war rather than allow any intervention of the Powers on behalf of his Christian subjects.
The information that has come to light from various quarters serves to strengthen the case against Lord Beaconsfield's policy in the years 1875-77.

The letter written by Mr.White to Sir Robert Morier on January 16, 1877, and referred to above, shows that his diplomatic experience had convinced him of the futility of supporting Turkey against the Powers.