Metz and Ladysmith possessed fewer advantages in this respect; and, considering the strength of the fortress and the size and quality of his army, Bazaine's conduct at Metz must rank as the weakest on record; for his 180,000 troops "contained" scarcely more than their own numbers of Germans.
On the other hand, Osman's force brought three times its number of Russians to a halt for five months before hastily constructed lines.

In the opinion of many authorities the Russians did wrong in making the whole campaign depend on Plevna.

When it was clear that Osman would cling to the defensive, they might with safety have secretly detached part of the besieging force to help the army of the Czarewitch to drive back the Turks on Shumla.

This would have involved no great risk; for the Russians occupied the inner lines of what was, roughly speaking, a triangle, resting on the Shipka Pass, the River Lom, and Plevna as its extreme points.

Having the advantage of the inner position, they could quickly have moved part of their force at Plevna, battered in the Turkish defence on the Lom, and probably captured the Slievno passes.