Epicurus denies that any one can live pleasantly who does not lead a life of virtue; he denies that fortune has any power over a wise man; he prefers a spare diet to great plenty, and maintains that a wise man is always happy.

All these things become a philosopher to say, but they are not consistent with pleasure.

But the reply is, that he doth not mean _that_ pleasure: let him mean any pleasure, it must be such a one as makes no part of virtue.

But suppose we are mistaken as to his pleasure; are we so, too, as to his pain?
I maintain, therefore, the impropriety of language which that man uses, when talking of virtue, who would measure every great evil by pain.
XXI.

And indeed the Epicureans, those best of men--for there is no order of men more innocent--complain that I take great pains to inveigh against Epicurus.