Langevin, for example--ask that atoms be promoted from the rank of hypotheses to that of principles.

By this they mean that the atomistic ideas forced upon us by an almost obligatory induction based on very exact experiments, enable us to co-ordinate a considerable amount of facts, to construct a very general synthesis, and to foresee a great number of phenomena.
It is of moment, moreover, to thoroughly understand that atomism does not necessarily set up the hypothesis of centres of attraction acting at a distance, and it must not be confused with molecular physics, which has, on the other hand, undergone very serious checks.

The molecular physics greatly in favour some fifty years ago leads to such complex representations and to solutions often so undetermined, that the most courageous are wearied with upholding it and it has fallen into some discredit.

It rested on the fundamental principles of mechanics applied to molecular actions; and that was, no doubt, an extension legitimate enough, since mechanics is itself only an experimental science, and its principles, established for the movements of matter taken as a whole, should not be applied outside the domain which belongs to them.

Atomism, in fact, tends more and more, in modern theories, to imitate the principle of the conservation of energy or that of entropy, to disengage itself from the artificial bonds which attached it to mechanics, and to put itself forward as an independent principle.
Atomistic ideas also have undergone evolution, and this slow evolution has been considerably quickened under the influence of modern discoveries.