[The Economic Consequences of the Peace by John Maynard Keynes]@TWC D-Link book
The Economic Consequences of the Peace

CHAPTER V
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The unwillingness of the Germans to conclude was mainly due to the lack of any absolute guarantee on the part of the Allies that, if they surrendered the ships, they would get the food.

But assuming reasonable good faith on the part of the latter (their behavior in respect of certain other clauses of the Armistice, however, had not been impeccable and gave the enemy some just grounds for suspicion), their demand was not an improper one; for without the German ships the business of transporting the food would have been difficult, if not impossible, and the German ships surrendered or their equivalent were in fact almost wholly employed in transporting food to Germany itself.

Up to June 30, 1919, 176 German ships of 1,025,388 gross tonnage had been surrendered, to the Allies in accordance with the Brussels Agreement.
[120] The amount of tonnage transferred may be rather greater and the value per ton rather less.

The aggregate value involved is not likely, however, to be less than $500,000,000 or greater than $750,000,000.
[121] This census was carried out by virtue of a Decree of August 23, 1918.

On March 22, 1917, the German Government acquired complete control over the utilization of foreign securities in German possession; and in May, 1917, it began to exercise these powers for the mobilization of certain Swedish, Danish, and Swiss securities.
[122] 1892.


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