On a basis of so much falsehood it became impossible to erect any constructive financial policy which was workable.

For this reason amongst others, a magnanimous financial policy was essential.

The financial position of France and Italy was so bad that it was impossible to make them listen to reason on the subject of the German Indemnity, unless one could at the same time point out to them some alternative mode of escape from their troubles.[103] The representatives of the United States were greatly at fault, in my judgment, for having no constructive proposals whatever to offer to a suffering and distracted Europe.
It is worth while to point out in passing a further element in the situation, namely, the opposition which existed between the "crushing" policy of M.Clemenceau and the financial necessities of M.Klotz.
Clemenceau's aim was to weaken and destroy Germany in every possible way, and I fancy that he was always a little contemptuous about the Indemnity; he had no intention of leaving Germany in a position to practise a vast commercial activity.

But he did not trouble his head to understand either the indemnity or poor M.Klotz's overwhelming financial difficulties.

If it amused the financiers to put into the Treaty some very large demands, well there was no harm in that; but the satisfaction of these demands must not be allowed to interfere with the essential requirements of a Carthaginian Peace.