To such a degree have I felt the necessity of sappers, at every siege at which I have been present, that I have always had reason to repent of not having more urgently solicited the creation of this company." Such are the views of the greatest of military engineers, a man who fought one hundred and forty battles, conducted fifty-eight sieges, and built or repaired three hundred fortifications.

His anticipations of the usefulness of engineer troops were fully realized, and they have ever since received the most careful attention, and now form, as has just been shown, one of the most important and efficient arms in the French service.

The fortifications constructed by the engineers, as organized by Vauban, have ever since constituted one of the principal elements of the French military power.
In the wars of Napoleon there are innumerable instances in illustration of the delays and disasters attending the operations of armies not supplied with engineer troops; and, on the other hand, the advantages resulting from their services when properly organized and instructed.

We have already pointed out the influence which the fortifications in the hands of the French exerted on the results of these wars, and the fatal consequences to the Allies of neglecting these works of national defence.

Every student of military history will immediately call to mind the influence of Savona, Coni, Mondovi, Ceva, Govi, Alessandria, Tortona, Pizzighitone, Peschiera, Mantua, Palma-Nuova, Osopo, Klagenfurth, &c., in the campaigns of 1796-7; of Genoa, Port Bard, the fortifications of the Var, Ulm, Ingoldstadt, &c., in 1800; of Milan, Turin, Mantua, Roco d'Aufo, Genoa, Alessandria, &c., in 1805; the importance of Kehl, Cassel, Wesel, &c., to the French in 1806, and the fatal consequences to the Prussians in that campaign, of their total and culpable neglect of their own fortifications.
All military historians speak of the influence of fortifications in the Peninsular campaigns: those which had been given up to Napoleon previous to the opening of hostilities, contributed very much to the success of his arms, while those which were retained by Spain and her allies, contributed in an equal degree to hamper and embarrass his operations.
Some of these, like Saragossa and Tarragona, with their broken walls and defective armaments, kept the enemy in check some sixty days each, and did much to weaken the French power in the Peninsula.
Temporary or field-fortifications also had an important influence here.
The lines of Torres-Vedras, the field-works of Ronda, the intrenched camps of the Pyrenees, Bayonne, Toulouse, &c., are examples under this head.