But, then, all the commerce of the country upon the ocean must be left to its fate; and no attempt can be made to react offensively upon the foe, unless we can control the chances of finding the enemy's fleets within his ports, and the still more uncertain chance of keeping him there; the escape of a single vessel being sufficient to cause the loss of our harbor.
These remarks are based upon the supposition that we have but the single harbor of New York; whereas Portland, Portsmouth, Boston, Newport, the Delaware, the Chesapeake, Charleston, Savannah, Pensacola, Mobile, New Orleans, and numerous other places, are equally open to attack, and therefore must be equally defended, for we know not to which the enemy will direct his assaults.

If he come to one of these in the absence of our fleet, his object is attained without resistance; or, if his whole force be concentrated upon one but feebly defended, we involve both fleet and harbor in inevitable ruin.

Could our fleet be so arranged as to meet these enterprises?
"As it cannot be denied that the enemy can select the point of attack out of the whole extent of coast, where is the prescience that can indicate the spot?
And if it cannot be foretold, how is that ubiquity to be imparted that shall always place our fleet in the path of the advancing foe?
Suppose we attempt to cover the coast by cruising in front of it, shall we sweep its whole length--a distance scarcely less than that which the enemy must traverse in passing from his coast to ours?
Must the Gulf of Mexico be swept, as well as the Atlantic; or shall we give up the Gulf to the enemy?
Shall we cover the southern cities, or give them up also?
We must unquestionably do one of two things--either relinquish a great extent of coast, confining our cruisers to a small portion only, or include so much that the chances of intercepting an enemy would seem to be out of the question." "On the practicability of covering a small extent of coast by cruising in front of it--or, in other words, the possibility of anticipating an enemy's operations, discovering the object of movements of which we get no glimpse and hear no tidings, and seeing the impress of his footsteps on the surface of the ocean--it may be well to consult experience." The naval power of Spain under Philip II.

was almost unlimited.

With the treasures of India and America at his command, the fitting out of a fleet of one hundred and fifty or two hundred sail, to invade another country, was no very gigantic operation.