But the quality of the color is not the only thing that we can distinguish in the experience.

In two experiences of color the quality may be the same, and yet the experiences may be different from each other.

In the one case we may have more of the same color--we may, so to speak, be conscious of a larger patch; but even if there is not actually more of it, there may be such a difference that we can know from the visual experience alone that the touch object before us is, in the one case, of the one shape, and, in the other case, of another.

Thus we may distinguish between the _stuff_ given in our experience and the _arrangement_ of that stuff.

This is the distinction which philosophers have marked as that between "matter" and "form." It is, of course, understood that both of these words, so used, have a special sense not to be confounded with their usual one.
This distinction between "matter" and "form" obtains in all our experiences.