It is not, I fear, possible that the moral sentiments of the British Army or Government should accord with those of Spain in her present condition.

Commanding power indeed (as hath been said), put forth in the repulse of the common enemy, would tend, more effectually than any thing save the prevalence of true wisdom, to prevent disagreement, and to obviate any temporary injury which the moral spirit of the Spaniards might receive from us: at all events--such power, should there ensue any injury, would bring a solid compensation.
But from a middle course--an association sufficiently intimate and wide to scatter every where unkindly passions, and yet unable to attain the salutary point of decisive power--no good is to be expected.

Great would be the evil, at this momentous period, if the hatred of the Spaniards should look two ways.

Let it be as steadily fixed upon the French, as the Pilot's eye upon his mark.

Military stores and arms should be furnished with unfailing liberality: let Troops also be supplied; but let these act separately,--taking strong positions upon the coast, if such can be found, to employ twice their numbers of the Enemy; and, above all, let there be floating Armies--keeping the Enemy in constant uncertainty where he is to be attacked.