In truth, they were obeying his order.] [Footnote 47: This evidence of the captains of the _Ocean_ and the _Elizabeth_ contradicts Palliser's charge that his ship was not adequately supported.] [Footnote 48: It was actually quite equal, but this was due to an accidental explosion on board the _Formidable_.] [Footnote 49: Chevalier.

Probably later by the other times used in this account.] [Footnote 50: The Order of Battle was constituted by the ships "of the line" ranging themselves one behind the other in a prescribed succession; the position of each and the intervals between being taken from the ship next ahead.

This made the leading vessel the pivot of the order and of manoeuvring, unless specially otherwise directed; which in an emergency could not always be easily done.

Strictly, if circumstances favoured, the line on which the ships thus formed was one of the two close-hauled lines; "close-hauled" meaning to bring the vessel's head as "near" the direction of the wind as possible, usually to about 70 degrees.

The advantage of the close-hauled line was that the vessels were more manageable than when "off" the wind.] [Footnote 51: Evidence of Captain John Laforey, of the _Ocean_.] [Footnote 52: "I do not recollect how many points I went from the wind; I must have bore down a pretty large course." Testimony of Captain J.Laforey, of the _Ocean_, on this point.] [Footnote 53: "During the night (of the 27th) Admiral Keppel kept away (_fit route_) for Portsmouth." Chevalier, "Marine Francaise," p.