When the greatest of the admirals apparently (but only apparently) confused the two antagonistic conceptions of breaking the line, there is much excuse for civilian writers being confused in fact.
The real interest of the matter, however, is to inquire, firstly, by what process of thought Howe in his second code discarded Rodney's manoeuvre as the primary meaning of his signal after having adopted it in his first, and, secondly, how and to what end did he arrive at his own method.
On the first point there can be little doubt.

Sir Charles H.Knowles gives us to understand that Howe still had Hoste's Treatise at his elbow, and with Hoste for his mentor we may be sure that, in common with other tactical students of his time, he soon convinced himself that Rodney's manoeuvre was usually dangerous and always imperfect.

Knowles himself in his old age, though a devout admirer of Rodney, denounced it in language of characteristic violence, and maintained to the last that Rodney never intended it, as every one now agrees was the truth.

Nelson presumably also approved Howe's cardinal improvement, or even in his most impulsive mood he would hardly have called him 'the first and greatest sea officer the world has ever produced.'[5] As to the second point--the fundamental intention of the new manoeuvre--we get again a valuable hint from Knowles.

Upon his second visit to the admiralty, after Howe had succeeded Keppel at the end of 1783, Knowles brought with him by request a tactical treatise written by his father, as well as certain of his own tactical studies, and discussed with Howe a certain manoeuvre which he believed the French employed for avoiding decisive actions.