Thus they can never make up their minds to seize any favourable opportunity that may present itself.

They are fettered by the strict rule to keep station, which is enforced upon them in both navies, and the usual result is that in one place ten of their ships may be firing on four, while in another four of their comrades may be receiving the fire of ten of the enemy.

Worst, of all, they are denied the confidence inspired by mutual support, which is as surely maintained by the English as it is neglected by us, who will not learn from them.'[12] This was probably the broad truth of the matter; it is summed up in the golden signal which was the panacea of British admirals when in doubt: 'Ships to take station for mutual support and engage as they come up;' and it fully explains why, with all the scientific appreciation of tactics that existed in the leading admirals of this time, their battles were usually so confused and haphazard.

The truth is that in the British service formal tactics had come to be regarded as a means of getting at your enemy, and not as a substitute for initiative in fighting him.
FOOTNOTES: [1] _Dictionary of National Biography, sub voce_ 'Howe,' p.

97.
[2] A copy of this is in the Admiralty Library issued to 'Thomas Lenox Frederick esq., Rear-Admiral of the Blue,' and attested by the autographs of Vice-Admiral James Gambier, Vice-Admiral James Young, and another lord of the admiralty, and countersigned by William Marsden, the famous numismatist and Oriental scholar, who was 'second secretary' from 1795 to 1804.