In spite of the fact that at Camperdown Duncan had actually found a sudden advantage by attacking in two divisions, no one had been found equal to the task of working out a tactical system to meet the inarticulate demands of the tendency which Grenier had noticed.

The possibilities even of Rodney's manoeuvre had not been followed up, and Howe had contented himself with his brilliant invention for increasing the impact and decision of the single line.

It was reserved for Nelson's genius to bring a sufficiently powerful solvent to bear on the crystallised opinion of the service, and to find a formula which would shed all that was bad and combine all that was good in previous systems.[7] The dominating ideas that were in his mind become clearer, if we follow step by step all the evidence that has survived as to the genesis and history of his memorandum.

As early as 1798, when he was hoping to intercept Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, he had adopted a system which was not based on the single line, and so far as is known this was the first tactical order he ever framed as a fleet commander.

It is contained in a general order issued from the Vanguard on June 8 of that year, and runs as follows, as though hot from the lesson of St.Vincent: 'As it is very probable the enemy will not be formed in regular order on the approach of the squadron under my command, I may in that case deem it most expedient to attack them by separate divisions.