In his view there was 'an entire alteration both of the scientific principle and of the tactical movements,' both of which he thinks were due to what he calls the _morale_ of the enemy's attitude--that is, that Nelson was afraid they were going to slip through his fingers into Cadiz.

The change of plan--meaning presumably the change from the triple to the dual organisation--he thinks was not due to the reduced numbers which Nelson actually had under his flag, for the ratio between the two fleets remained much about the same as that of his hypothesis.
The interesting testimony of Lieutenant G.L.Browne, who, as Admiral Jackson informs us, was assistant flag-lieutenant in the Victory and had every means of knowing, endorses the view of the Moorsoms.[21] After explaining to his parents the delay caused by the established method of forming the fleets in two parallel lines so that each had an opposite number, as set forth in the opening words of the memorandum, he says, 'but by his lordship's mode of attack you will clearly perceive not an instant of time could be lost.

The frequent communications he had with his admirals and captains put them in possession of all his plans, so that his mode of attack was well known to every officer of the fleet.

Some will not fail to attribute rashness to the conduct of Lord Nelson.

But he well considered the importance of a decisive naval victory at this time, and has frequently said since we left England that, should he be so fortunate as to fall in with the enemy, a total defeat should be the result on the one side or the other.' Next we have what is probably the most acute and illuminating criticism of the battle that exists, from the pen of 'an officer who was present.' Sir Charles Ekin quotes it anonymously; but from internal evidence there is little difficulty in assigning it to an officer of the Conqueror, though clearly not her captain, Israel Pellew, in whose justification the concluding part was written.
Whoever he was the writer thoroughly appreciated and understood the tactical basis of Nelson's plan, as laid down in the memorandum, and he frankly condemns his chief for having exposed his fleet unnecessarily by permitting himself to be hurried out of delivering his attack in line abreast as he intended.