In the 'Observations' we have the monition not to attempt the manoeuvre 'unless an enemy press you on a lee shore.' We have the signal for a squadron breaking the enemy's line, but only in order to rejoin the main body, and we have the simple method of parrying the move by tacking with an equal number of ships.

The fundamental principles of the problem in both the English and the French author are the same, and a comparison of the two enables us to assert, with no hesitation, that the manoeuvre of breaking the line was abandoned by the tacticians of that era, not from ignorance nor from lack of enterprise, but from a deliberate tactical conviction gained by experience in war.

In judging the apparent want of enterprise which our own admirals began to display in action at this time, we should probably be careful to refrain from joining in the unmitigated contempt with which modern historians have so freely covered them.

In the typical battle of Malaga, for instance, Rooke did nothing but carry out the principles which were the last word of Tourville's brilliant career.

Nor must it be forgotten that, although Rodney executed the manoeuvre in 1782, and Hood provided a signal for its revival which Howe at first adopted, it was never in much favour in the British service, seeing that it was only adapted for an attack from to leeward.