Tactics, in fact, in accordance with a sound and inevitable law, having tended to become too recklessly offensive, were exhibiting a reaction to the defensive.

If the enemy had succeeded in forming his line, it had come to be regarded as too hazardous to attempt to divide his fleet unless you had first forced a gap by driving ships out of the line.

This idea we see reflected in the 6th paragraph of the Duke of York's twenty-second article (1673) and in Russell's new twenty-third article, enjoining ships to close up any gap that may have been caused by the next ahead or astern having been forced out of the line.

Briefly stated, it may be said that the preoccupation of naval tactics was now not so much to break the enemy's line, as to prevent your own being broken.
But the matter did not end here.

It was seen that when your own fleet was superior, concentration was still practicable in various ways, and particularly by doubling.