Let them keep this test and reject the other, for the two cannot be fused together.
[Greek: oxos t' aleipha t' egcheas tauto kutei dichostatount an ou philoin prosennepois.] This inconsistency is here, however, only a side point--a passing illustration of the slovenliness of the positivist logic.

As far as my present argument goes, we may let this pass altogether, and allow the joint existence of these mutually exclusive ends.

What I am about to do is to show that on positive grounds the last of these is more hopelessly inadequate than the first--that truth as a moral end has even more of religion in its composition than happiness, and that when this religion goes, its value will even more hopelessly evaporate.
At first sight this may seem impossible.

The devotion to truth may seem as simple as it is sacred.

But if we consider the matter further, we shall soon think differently.