They are not moral difficulties at all.

Mill truly says that they involve a contradiction in terms.

But why?
Not, as Mill says, because a wicked God is set up as the object of moral worship, but because, in spite of all the wickedness existing, the Author of all existences is affirmed not to be wicked.
Nor, again, is Mill right in saying that this contradiction is due to '_slovenliness of thought_.' Theology accepts it with its eyes wide open, making no attempt to explain the inexplicable; and the human will it treats in the same way.

It makes no offer to us to clear up everything, or to enable thought to put a girdle round the universe.

On the contrary, it proclaims with emphasis that its first axioms are unthinkable; and its most renowned philosophic motto is, '_I believe because it is impossible_.' What shall it say, then, when assailed by the rational moralist?
It will not deny its own condition, but it will show its opponent that his is really the same.