Practically speaking, therefore, strategy would divide our naval force into Atlantic and Pacific fleets, but those fleets might be very unequal in size, owing to the vastly greater commercial and national interests on our Atlantic coast, and the greater remoteness of probable enemies on our Pacific coast.
In estimating the work to be done by the U.S.Atlantic fleet, three general objects suggest themselves: 1.

To repel an attack made directly on our Atlantic continental coast.
2.

To repel an expedition striving to establish a base in the Caribbean, preliminary to an attack on our Atlantic continental coast or on the Panama Canal.
3.

To make an expedition to a distant point, to prevent the occupation of territory by a foreign government in the south Atlantic or the Pacific.
_First Object_ .-- To repel an attack made directly on the Atlantic coast, the plan must provide for getting the needed additions to the fleet with the utmost despatch.

Owing to the keen appreciation by European nations of the value of secrecy and despatch, any attack contemplated by one of them on our Atlantic coast would be prepared behind the curtain, and nothing about its preparation would be allowed to be reported to the outside world until after the attacking force had actually sailed.