Offensive operations are, as a rule, carried on farther from home than defensive operations.

If _A_ is carrying on offensive operations against _B_, _A_ is usually farther away from his home than _B_ is from his home.

We see from this that the offensive has the advantage of the initiative, of making an attack for which the enemy may be unprepared, and has the disadvantage of being far from its home bases; whereas the defensive has the disadvantage of not knowing when or where or whence an attack is to come, and the advantage of the support of various kinds given by home bases.

In other words, the offensive has the advantage except in so far as it is impaired by unfavorable conditions.
For this reason, every military nation at the outset of war desires to be able to assume the offensive; and only refrains from the offensive from motives of prudence or because, in a particular case, the distance between the adversaries is so great, that the lack of bases would be of greater weight than the advantage of the initiative--or because the situations of the contending parties would be such that the side accepting the defensive role and staying near home, might be able to carry on aggressive attacks better than could the other.

An illustration of a mistake in taking the offensive, and the wisdom of the other side in accepting the defensive, may be seen in Napoleon's expedition against Russia; for the Russians were able to repel his attack completely, and then to assume a terrible offensive against his retreating, disorganized, and starving army.
Another illustration was the expedition made by a weak Spanish fleet under Cervera to the Caribbean in 1898.