In the meantime the French government put forth, by way of commentary on Lord Grenville's state paper, a pretended letter from the unfortunate heir of the House of Stuart to George III., demanding from him the throne of England, which, now that the principle of legitimacy seemed to be recognised at St.James's, there could (said the pasquinade) be no fair pretext for refusing.

Some other trifles of the same character might be noticed; but the true answer to Mr.Pitt was the campaign of Marengo.
Buonaparte rejoiced cordially in the result of his informal negotiation.
It was his policy, even more clearly than it had been that of his predecessors, to buy security at home by battle and victory abroad.

The national pride had been deeply wounded during his absence; and something must be done in Europe, worthy of the days of Lodi, and Rivoli, and Tagliamento, ere he could hope to be seated firmly on his _throne_.

On receiving the answer of the British minister, he said to Talleyrand (rubbing his hands, as was his custom when much pleased), "it could not have been more favourable." On the same day, the 7th of January (just three days after the date of Lord Grenville's note), the First Consul issued his edict for the formation of an army of reserve, consisting of all the veterans who had ever served, and a new levy of 30,000 conscripts.
At this time France had four armies on her frontiers: that of the North, under Brune, watched the partisans of the House of Orange in Holland, and guarded those coasts against any new invasion from England; the defeat of the Duke of York had enabled the government to reduce its strength considerably.

The second was the army of the Danube, under Jourdan, which, after the defeat at Stockach, had been obliged to repass the Rhine.