When due altogether to the immediate force of suggestion in a present object or event, and not involving any conscious transition from past to future, or from general truth to particular instance, these errors appear to me to have more of the character of illusions than of that of fallacies.
Much the same thing may be said about the vivid anticipations of a familiar kind of experience called up by a clear and consecutive verbal suggestion.

When a man, even with an apparent air of playfulness, tells me that something is going to happen, and gives a consistent consecutive account of this, I have an anticipation which is not consciously grounded on any past experience of the value of human testimony in general, or of this person's testimony in particular, but which is instantaneous and quasi-immediate.

Consequently, any error connected with the mental act approximates to an illusion.
So far I have supposed that the anticipated event is a recurring one, that is to say, a kind of experience which has already become familiar to us.

This, however, holds good only of a very few of our experiences.
Our life changes as it progresses, both outwardly and inwardly.

Many of our anticipations, when first formed, involve much more than a reproduction of a past experience, namely, a complex act of constructive imagination.