And even after the habit of passing from the past to the future, from memory to expectation, has been formed, the number of the past repetitions of experience would prevent the mind's clearly reverting to them.

And, further, the very force of habit would tend to make the transition from memory to expectation more and more rapid, automatic, and unconscious.
Thus it comes about that all distinctly suggested approaching events seem to be expected by a kind of immediate act of belief.

The present signs call up the representation of the coming event with all the force of a direct intuition.

At least, it may be said that if a process of inference, it is one which has the minimum degree of consciousness.
It might still be urged that the mind passes from the _present_ facts as signs, and so still performs a kind of reasoning process.

This is, no doubt, true, and differentiates expectation from perception, in which there is no conscious transition from the presented to the represented.
Still I take it that this is only a process of reasoning in so far as the sign is consciously generalized, and this is certainly not true of early expectations, or even of any expectations in a wholly uncultivated mind.
For these reasons I think that any errors involved in such an anticipation may, without much forcing, be brought under our definition of illusion.