It must have been plain to an attentive reader throughout our exposition that, in spite of our provisional distinction, no sharp line can be drawn between much of what, on the surface, looks like immediate knowledge, and consciously derived or inferred knowledge.

On its objective side, reasoning may be roughly defined as a conscious transition of mind from certain facts or relations of facts to other facts or relations recognized as similar.
According to this definition, a fallacy would be a hasty, unwarranted transition to new cases not identical with the old.

And a good part of immediate knowledge is fundamentally the same, only that here, through the exceptional force of association and habit, the transition is too rapid to be consciously recognized.

Consequently, illusion becomes identified at bottom with fallacious inference: it may be briefly described as collapsed inference.

Thus, illusory perception and expectation are plainly a hasty transition of mind from old to new, from past to present, conjunctions of experience.[150] And, as we have seen, an illusory general belief owes its existence to a coalescence of representations of known facts or connections with products of imagination which simulate the appearance of inferences from these facts.
In the case of memory, in so far as it is not aided by reasoning from present signs, there seems to be nothing like a movement of inference.
It is evident, indeed, that memory is involved in and underlies every such transition of thought.