Hence genus and species stand in subaltern relation, and whatever is true of the genus is true of the species: If _All animal life is dependent on vegetation, All human life is dependent on vegetation_.

On the other hand, whatever is not true of the species or narrower term, cannot be true of the whole genus: If it is false that '_All human life is happy_,' it is false that '_All animal life is happy_.' Similar inferences may be drawn from the subaltern relation of predicates; affirming the species we affirm the genus.

To take Mill's example, if _Socrates is a man, Socrates is a living creature_.

On the other hand, denying the genus we deny the species: if _Socrates is not vicious, Socrates is not drunken_.
Such cases as these are recognised by Mill and Bain as immediate inferences under the principle of Identity.

But some Logicians might treat them as imperfect syllogisms, requiring another premise to legitimate the conclusion, thus: _All animal life is dependent on vegetation; All human life is animal life; .'.