Before Sir William Howe had, in any degree disclosed his views, intelligence was received of the appearance of Burgoyne on Lake Champlain, and that Ticonderoga was threatened.

This intelligence strengthened the opinion that the design of Howe must be to seize the passes in the mountains on the Hudson, secure the command of that river, and effect a junction between the two armies.

Yet he could not permit himself to yield so entirely to this impression, as to make a movement which might open the way by land to Philadelphia.
His army therefore maintained its station at Middlebrook; but arrangements were made to repel any sudden attack on the posts which defended the Hudson.
Some changes made in the stations of the British ships and troops having relieved the American general from his apprehensions of a sudden march to Philadelphia, he advanced Sullivan's division to Pompton Plains, on the way to Peekskill; and proceeded with the main body of his army, to Morristown;--thus approaching the highlands of New York, without removing so far from Middlebrook as to be unable to regain that camp should General Howe indicate an intention to seize it.
Meanwhile, the British General prosecuted, diligently, his plan of embarkation, which was, necessarily, attended with circumstances indicating a much longer voyage than that up the North River.

These circumstances were immediately communicated to the eastern states, and congress was earnestly pressed to strengthen the fortifications on the Delaware, and to increase the obstructions in that river.
{July 16.} In the midst of these appearances, certain intelligence was received that Burgoyne was in great force on the lakes, and was advancing against Ticonderoga.

This intelligence confirmed the opinion that the main object of Howe must be to effect a junction with Burgoyne on the North River.