Many of their muskets were scarcely fit for service; and, being of unequal calibre, their cartridges could not be so well fitted, and, consequently, their fire could not do as much execution as that of the enemy.

This radical defect was felt in all the operations of the army.
From the ardour with which the Commander-in-chief had inspired his troops before this action, it is probable that the conflict would have been more severe, had the intelligence respecting the movement on the left of the British army been less contradictory.

Raw troops, changing their ground in the moment of action, and attacked in the agitation of moving, are easily thrown into confusion.

This was the critical situation of a part of Sullivan's division, and was the cause of the right's breaking before Greene could be brought up to support it; after which, it was impossible to retrieve the fortune of the day.
But had the best disposition of the troops been made at the time, which subsequent intelligence would suggest, the action could not have terminated in favour of the Americans.

Their inferiority in numbers, in discipline, and in arms, was too great to leave them a probable prospect of victory.