When the armies were separated by a storm which involved him in the most distressing circumstances, he extricated himself from them, and still maintained a respectable and imposing countenance.
The only advantage he is supposed to have given was at the battle of Brandywine; and that was produced by the contrariety and uncertainty of the intelligence received.

A general must be governed by his intelligence, and must regulate his measures by his information.

It is his duty to obtain correct information; and among the most valuable traits of a military character, is the skill to select those means which will obtain it.

Yet the best selected means are not always successful; and, in a new army, where military talent has not been well tried by the standard of experience, the general is peculiarly exposed to the chance of employing not the best instruments.

In a country, too, which is covered with wood, precise information of the numbers composing different columns is to be gained with difficulty.
It has been said "that the Americans do not appear to have made all the use that might be expected of the advantages which the country afforded for harassing and impeding the British army." In estimating this objection, it ought to be recollected that General Smallwood was directed, with the militia of Maryland and Delaware, supported by a regiment of continental troops, to hang on and harass the rear of the enemy: that General Maxwell, with a select corps consisting of a thousand men, was ordered to seize every occasion to annoy him on his march: that General Wayne, with his division, was afterwards detached to unite with Smallwood, and command the whole force collected in the rear, which would have been very respectable.
If the militia did not assemble in the numbers expected, or effect the service allotted to them, their failure is not attributable to General Washington.