It would be indispensably necessary to carry all these redoubts; since to leave a part of them to play on the rear of the columns, while engaged in front with the enemy in Philadelphia, would be extremely hazardous.
Supposing the redoubts carried, and the British army driven into the town, yet all military men were agreed on the great peril of storming a town.

The streets would be defended by an artillery greatly superior to that of the Americans, which would attack in front, while the brick houses would be lined with musketeers, whose first must thin the ranks of the assailants.
A part of the plan, on the successful execution of which the whole depended, was, that the British rear should be surprised by the corps descending the Delaware.

This would require the concurrence of too many favourable circumstances to be calculated on with any confidence.
As the position of General Greene was known, it could not be supposed that Sir William Howe would be inattentive to him.

It was probable that not even his embarkation would be made unnoticed; but it was presuming a degree of negligence which ought not to be assumed, to suppose that he could descend the river to Philadelphia undiscovered.
So soon as his movements should be observed, the whole plan would be comprehended, since it would never be conjectured that General Greene was to attack singly.
If the attack in front should fail, which was not even improbable, the total loss of the two thousand men in the rear must follow; and General Howe would maintain his superiority through the winter.
The situation of America did not require these desperate measures.

The British general would be compelled to risk a battle on equal terms, or to manifest a conscious inferiority to the American army.