He could not be supposed hostile himself to the prevalence of this opinion; and some parts of his conduct would seem to warrant a belief that, if it did not originate with him, he was not among the last to adopt it.

After the victory of the seventh of October had opened to him the prospect of subduing the arms of Burgoyne, he not only omitted to communicate his success to General Washington, but carried on a correspondence with General Conway, in which that officer expressed great contempt for the Commander-in-chief.

When the purport of this correspondence was disclosed to General Washington, Gates demanded the name of the informer in a letter far from being conciliatory in its terms, which was accompanied with the very extraordinary circumstance of being passed through congress.[97] The state of Pennsylvania too, chagrined at the loss of its capital, and forgetful of its own backwardness in strengthening the army, which had twice fought superior numbers in its defence, furnished many discontented individuals.

They imputed it to General Washington as a fault that, with forces inferior to his enemy in numbers, and in every equipment, he had not effected the same result which had been produced in the north, by a continental army, in itself, much stronger than its adversary, and so reinforced by militia as to treble his numbers.

On the report that General Washington was moving into winter quarters, the legislature of that state addressed a remonstrance to congress on the subject, manifesting, in very intelligible terms, their dissatisfaction with the Commander-in-chief.
About the same time, a new board of war was created, of which General Gates was appointed the President; and General Mifflin, who was supposed to be of the party unfriendly to Washington, was one of its members.