When the people are obliged, by tyranny or other accidents, to have recourse to the first principles of society, namely, their own preservation, in electing a new sovereign, it will deserve consideration, whether that choice is to be effected by the majority of a parliament which has been dissolved, indeed by any parliament whatsoever, or by the body of the nation assembled in communities, corporations, by tribes or centuries, to signify their assent or dissent with respect to the person proposed as their sovereign.

This kind of election might be attended with great inconvenience and difficulty, but these cannot possibly be avoided when the constitution is dissolved by setting aside the lineal succession to the throne.

The constitution of England is founded on a parliament consisting of kings, lords, and commons; but when there is no longer a king, the parliament is defective, and the constitution impaired: the members of the lower house are the representatives of the people, expressly chosen to maintain the constitution in church and state, and sworn to support the rights of the crown, as well as the liberties of the nation; but though they are elected to maintain, they have no power to alter, the constitution.

When the king forfeits the allegiance of his subjects, and it becomes necessary to dethrone him, the power of so doing cannot possibly reside in the representatives who are chosen, under certain limitations, for the purposes of a legislature which no longer exists; their power is of course at an end, and they are reduced to a level with other individuals that constitute the community.

The right of altering the constitution, therefore, or of deviating from the established practice of inheritance in regard to the succession of the crown, is inherent in the body of the people; and every individual has an equal right to his share in the general determination, whether his opinion be signified _viva voce_, or by a representative whom he appoints and instructs for that purpose.