Just as much as an unfortunate campaign lowers the courage and moral powers of an Army, a successful one raises these elements in their value.

In the generality of cases, therefore, these influences are compensated, and then there remains over and above as clear gain the habituation to War.
We should besides look more here to successful than to unsuccessful campaigns, because when the greater probability of the latter may be seen beforehand, without doubt forces are wanted, and, therefore, the reserving a portion for future use is out of the question.
This point being settled, then the question is, Do the losses which a force sustains through fatigues and privations increase in proportion to the size of the force, as is the case in a combat?
And to that we answer "No." The fatigues of War result in a great measure from the dangers with which every moment of the act of War is more or less impregnated.

To encounter these dangers at all points, to proceed onwards with security in the execution of one's plans, gives employment to a multitude of agencies which make up the tactical and strategic service of the Army.
This service is more difficult the weaker an Army is, and easier as its numerical superiority over that of the enemy increases.

Who can doubt this?
A campaign against a much weaker enemy will therefore cost smaller efforts than against one just as strong or stronger.
So much for the fatigues.

It is somewhat different with the privations; they consist chiefly of two things, the want of food, and the want of shelter for the troops, either in quarters or in suitable camps.