These assumptions are extremely different from the common-sense notions of men, and they are utterly unnecessary for the support of any doctrine which we are concerned to defend.
On the whole, we venture to conclude that the radical distinction between Mind and Matter has not been materially affected by the recent progress of Physiological research, and that the old arguments against Materialism are still available, except in so far as they were founded on a too limited view of the properties of matter, which the advancing Science of Chemistry has done so much, to unfold and to illustrate.
II.

Our _second_ proposition may be thus stated: That were we reduced to the necessity of embracing any form of the theory of "unisubstancisme," there could not be less,--there might even be greater,--reason for _spiritualizing matter_, than for _materializing mind_.
On the supposition that one or other of the two must be dispensed with, the question still remains, which of them can be most easily spared?
or, which of them can be most conclusively proved?
Mankind have generally thought that they had equally good evidence for the existence of both; that in the direct and irresistible evidence of Consciousness, they had proof sufficient of a thinking, voluntary, and active spirit, and in the less direct, but not less irresistible, evidence of Perception, proof sufficient of the existence of a material world.

But each of these convictions has been in its turn assailed by the cavils of skepticism; and men have been asked to prove _by reasoning_ what needed, and, indeed, admitted of no _such_ proof,--the existence of Matter as distinct from Mind, and the existence of Mind as distinct from Matter.
The latter is denied by Materialists, the former is equally denied by Idealists; and what we affirm is, that each of these opposite theories is one-sided and partial, and that, on the supposition of our being reduced to the necessity of adopting the idea of "unisubstancisme," we should still have greater reason to reduce all to the category of "spirit," than to reduce all to the category of "matter." Many seem to think that it is more easy, or, perhaps, that it is less necessary, to prove the distinct existence of matter, than to prove the distinct existence of mind.

They are so familiar with matter, and so continually surrounded by it, that they cannot conceive of its non-existence as possible, and scarcely think it necessary to inquire after any evidence in the case.

But can it be justly said that they are more familiar with matter and its movements than they are with a living spirit within them, which feels, and thinks, and wills, and by means of which alone the phenomena of external nature itself can become known to them?
If they receive the testimony of Perception as a sufficient proof of the existence of Matter, why should they not also receive the still more direct and immediate testimony of Consciousness as a sufficient proof of the existence of Mind?
Or, if they refuse the latter, and admit the former, are they quite sure that, on their own partial principles, they could offer any conclusive answer to the "Idealism" of Berkeley?
That ingenious and amiable prelate will tell them that "the objects of sense cannot exist otherwise than _in a mind perceiving them_;" that "their _esse_ is _percipi_, nor is it possible that they should have any existence out of the minds, or thinking things, which perceive them;" and that "all the choir of heaven and the furniture of the earth,--in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind."[162] Nay, others who are not Idealists, but who believe equally in the existence of "mind" and "matter," will tell them that Berkeley's arguments are conclusive, at least to the extent of showing that the existence of "matter," as a thing external to us, cannot be proved without presupposing the existence of "mind." "For what," says Lord Brougham, "is this matter?
Whence do we derive any knowledge of it?
How do we assure ourselves of its existence?
What evidence have we at all respecting either its being or its qualities?
We feel, or taste, or smell something; that is, we have certain sensations, which make us conclude that something exists beyond ourselves." ...