His Providence, as it is declared and exemplified in Scripture, has _a necessary reference to the natural constitution of things_; and hence the Westminster Confession, in the spirit of the highest philosophy, and with admirable discrimination and accuracy, affirms that "God, the Creator of all things, doth uphold, direct, dispose, and govern, all creatures, actions, and things, from the greatest even to the least, by His most wise and holy Providence;" that "by the same Providence, He ordereth all things to fall out _according to the nature of second causes_, either necessarily, freely, or contingently;" and that "God in His ordinary Providence maketh use of means, yet is free to work without, above, and against them at His pleasure."[188] "Natural laws" and "second causes" are thus established by experience, and explicitly recognized in Scripture.

It is necessary, however, especially with reference to certain modern speculations, to discriminate between the two; and to show that while they are closely related and equally legitimate objects of philosophical inquiry, they are nevertheless radically different, as well as easily distinguishable, from each other.

It is the favorite doctrine of the Positive school in France that the knowledge of "causes" is utterly interdicted to man, and that the only science to which he should aspire consists exclusively in the knowledge of "phenomena," and their cooerdination under "general laws." M.Comte explicitly avows this doctrine, and Mr.Mill and Mr.
Lewes give it their implied sanction.[189] According to their theory, all Science is limited to "the laws of the coexistence and succession of phenomena," and "causes" are not only unknown, but incapable of being known.

And to such an extent is this doctrine carried that M.Comte anticipates the possible ultimate reduction of _all_ "phenomena" to _one_ all-comprehensive, all-pervading "law," as the highest perfection of Science and the decisive extinction of Religion; while Mr.Mill, doubtful of this being possible, thinks it conceivable, at least, that there may be worlds, different from our own, in which events occur _without causes_ of any kind, and even without any _fixed law_.
In regard to this theory it might well be asked, how it comes to pass that human language, which is the natural exponent of human thought, should contain, in every one of its multifarious dialects, so many expressions which denote or imply "causation," if it be true that all knowledge of causes is utterly inaccessible to the human faculties?
Nay, why is it that the axiom of causation needs only to be announced to command the immediate assent of the whole human race?
It will be found, we believe, that even in the case of those who contend for this theory, the instinctive and spontaneous belief in "causation" is not extinguished nor even impaired; but that they seek merely _to substitute "laws" for "causes_," or rather to represent _the laws of nature_ as the only _efficient causes_ of all natural phenomena.
They thus identify or confound two things which it is of the utmost consequence to discriminate and keep distinct.

There is an ambiguity, however, in the common usage of the term "law," which may seem to give a plausible appearance to their theory, or at least to vail over and conceal its radical fallacy.