CHAPTER VI.
THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE.
When we survey the actual course of God's Providence, by which the eternal purposes of the Divine Mind are carried into effect, we discern immediately a marked difference between _two great classes of events_.
The one comprehends a multitude of events which are so regular, stable, and constant, that we feel ourselves warranted in reckoning on their invariable recurrence, in the same circumstances in which they have been observed; they seem to be governed by an unchangeable, or at least an established law.

The other comprehends a different set of events, which are so irregular and variable that they occur quite unexpectedly, and cannot be reduced to any rule of rational computation; they appear,--perhaps from our ignorance,--to be purely accidental or fortuitous.
In exact accordance with this difference between the two great classes of Providential events, there is a similar difference in our _internal views or sentiments_ in regard to them.

We are conscious of two totally dissimilar feelings in contemplating them respectively.

We have a feeling of certainty, confidence, or assurance in regard to the one; and a feeling of uncertainty, anxiety, and helplessness in regard to the other; while for an intermediate class of events, there is also an intermediate state of mind, equally removed from entire certainty and absolute doubt, arising from the various degrees of _probability_ that may seem to belong to them.

These are at once natural and legitimate sentiments in the circumstances in which we are placed; for unquestionably there is much in these circumstances that is fitted to produce and cherish them all; and when they are combined,--especially when they are duly proportioned, in the case of any individual, they induce a habit or frame of mind most favorable to the recognition of God's Providence, and most conducive to our welfare, by impressing us with a sense both of our _dependence_ on His supreme will, and of our _duty to be diligent_ in the use of all appointed means.