We have no hesitation in declaring our decided preference for the second form of the third theory,--that which resolves the principle or ground of Certitude into EVIDENCE; but EVIDENCE considered both _objectively_ and _subjectively_,--_objectively_, as that which exists whether it is perceived or not, and is independent of the caprices of individual minds, and _subjectively_, as that which must be discerned before its proper impression can be produced, which must be judged of according to the laws of human thought, and which, when so discerned and judged of, imparts a feeling of assurance which no sophistry can shake and no philosophy strengthen.
According to some recent theories, Certitude belongs to our knowledge, only because that knowledge is derived from a reason superior to our own,--a reason not personal, but universal, not individual but generic, which, although not belonging to ourselves, is supposed to hold communication with our minds: and if this were meant merely to remind us of the limitation of our faculties, and of our consequent liability to error, or even to teach us the duty of acknowledging our dependence on a higher power, it might be alike unobjectionable and salutary; but when it is applied to undermine the authority of private judgment and to supersede the exercise of free inquiry, they have a tendency to excite suspicion and distrust in every thoughtful mind.

The capital error which pervades all these speculations consists in not distinguishing aright between the _evidence_ which constitutes the ground of our belief, and the _faculty_ by which that evidence is discerned and appreciated.

The Generic Reason of Lamennais, as well as the uniform Tradition of the Church, may constitute, when duly improved, a branch of the objective evidence for the truth, and as such they have been applied even by Protestant writers when they have appealed to _common consent_ as a collateral proof, auxiliary to that which is more direct and conclusive; but they cannot be regarded as the exclusive grounds of the certainty of human knowledge, since this arises from the fundamental, universal, and invariable laws of human thought.
* * * * * The term Skepticism, again, may denote either a mere _state of mind_,--a state of suspense or doubt in regard to some particular fact or opinion; or _a system of speculative philosophy_, relating to the principles of human knowledge or the grounds of human belief.

In the former sense, it implies nothing more than the want of a sure and satisfactory conviction of the truth on the particular point in question.

Were it expressed in words, it would simply amount to a verdict of "non liquet." In the latter sense, it imports much more than this; it is not merely a _sense_ of doubt respecting any one truth, but a _system_ of doubt in regard to the grounds of our belief in all truth, a subtle philosophy which seeks to explain the phenomena of Belief by resolving them into their ultimate principles, and which often terminates--in explaining them away.