Knowledge is thus possible under other conditions than the contingent laws to which certain intelligences may be subject; in other words, there is no contradiction in affirming that an intelligent being may have knowledge of some kind or other without having such senses as we have."[285] The application of analogy as a principle of judgment is subject to certain well-known limitations, which cannot be disregarded without serious risk of error.

They are well stated by Dr.Hampden: "There are two requisites in order to every analogical argument:--1.

That the two, or several particulars concerned in the argument should be known to agree in some one point; for otherwise they could not be referable to any one class, and there would consequently be no basis to the subsequent inference drawn in the conclusion.2.That the conclusion must be modified by a reference to the circumstances of the particular _to_ which we argue.

For herein consists _the essential distinction between an analogical and an inductive argument_.

Since, in an inductive argument, we draw a general conclusion, we have no concern with the circumstantial peculiarity of individual instances, but simply with their abstract agreement.