For why _ought_ I to do this, or refrain from that?
Because it is _useful_?
because it is conducive to _happiness_?
Because it will be followed by certain natural consequences?
But if I love the pleasures of sin, if I prefer them to every other kind of enjoyment, if I am willing to accept the consequences and to say, "Evil, be thou my good," what is there in the system of secular ethics that should oblige me to forego my favorite indulgences, or that can impress me with the conviction that I _ought_ to do so?
True I may suffer, and suffer much, as the drunkard and the libertine do, in the way of natural consequence, and it may be prudent to be temperate in the indulgence of my sensual appetites; there may even be a sense of inward degradation, and a politic regard to the opinions of my fellow-men, which will operate to some extent as a restraining influence; but if I be destitute of a sense of _duty_, and willing to brave all hazards and accept all consequences, Secularism has nothing to say to me, and is utterly powerless to govern or control me otherwise than by physical coercion or the power of brute force.

But admit the idea of God as a Moral Governor, and of Conscience as His vicegerent in my soul, view the law of my moral nature as the authoritative expression of His supreme will, and instantly I recognize a Master whom I _ought_ to obey, and a course of conduct which it is my _duty_ to pursue, irrespective alike of my personal propensities and of all possible consequences.

The "categoric imperative" within is felt to be a far more solid ground, as well as a much stronger sanction, of duty, than any that can be found in the mere consequences of my actions; while it accounts for the innate sense of right and wrong, and the sentiments of remorse, and shame, and fear which conscious guilt inspires.
But Mr.Holyoake shifts the question from this broad general ground, which is common to all earnest inquirers after truth, and seeks to entangle us in a collateral, but subordinate, discussion respecting the relation between Morality and Scripture.

He proposes to show that "there exist, _independently of Scriptural Religion_, guarantees of morality in human nature," and that "morals may be established _independently of scriptural authority_." But this is not the question: the question is a wider and more comprehensive one, namely, whether a system of morals can be established apart from the recognition of God, and independently of _any_ expression, natural or supernatural, of His supreme and authoritative will?
Mr.Holyoake is bound to return and defend an affirmative to _this_ question, and is not at liberty to take refuge in the mere denial of the absolute dependence of morals on "scriptural authority." The idea of _duty_ may be involved in the principles of Natural Religion, and these may be presupposed and assumed in Revelation; but to make out his case, he must attempt to show that neither Natural nor Revealed Religion is necessary to establish and sanction a code of ethics, and that the natural consequences of our actions are sufficient _of themselves_, and without reference to the law of a Supreme Will, to awaken and sustain a sense of moral obligation.

In point of fact, Christianity does not represent the duties of morality as dependent on its own _sole_ authority.