Nothing can justify us, nothing can give us confidence, but the _conscientious nature_ of our own conclusions; nothing can give us courage but _innocence_; nothing can serve our turn but having believed according to _the best of our judgment_, and having followed those principles which _seem to us_ to be the truth." He takes refuge, then, first in his _good works_, and secondly in the _sincerity_ of his convictions, as the sole grounds of his confidence in the prospect of "confronting the interrogations of the Eternal!" Is it wonderful,--such being his only hope in death,--that when cholera appeared in London, and multitudes were suddenly removed by that appalling visitation, he should have felt it necessary to deliver a series of Lectures,--now reprinted as "The Logic of Death,"-- "with a view to the assurance of his friends ?" Might there not be some among them who would shrink from a future judgment on the ground of their "innocence" or "good works," and many more who would feel that they were making an awful venture in leaving their eternity to depend on the mere _sincerity_ of their convictions, in whatever way these convictions may have been formed, and whether they were _true or false_?
And could they be reassured or comforted by any other article of the Secular Creed?
They might be told, as Mr.Holyoake tells them, "I am not an unbeliever, if that implies the rejection of Christian truth, since all I reject is Christian error:" I reject "the fall of man, the atonement, the sin of unbelief, the doctrine of future punishment; a disbeliever in all these doctrines, why should I fear to die ?" But the more thoughtful among them, all who were really in earnest, might desiderate something more; they might see that _disbelief_, however dogmatic, does not amount to _disproof_, and that the _real ground of fear_ is not in the least removed by it.

Does his question imply, that if these doctrines were _true_, he would have just reason to fear death?
or does it mean merely, that whether they be true or false, he can have no reason to fear death, simply because he _disbelieves_ them?
On the former supposition, how vast the difference between the Secularist and the Christian?
The one would have reason to fear because these doctrines are or may be true; the other believes them to be true, and finds in that very belief a deliverance from the fear of death, and a firm ground of confidence and hope! On the latter supposition,--which we believe to be the correct one,--what an amazing confidence must that man possess in the _sincerity_ of his convictions, the _conscientiousness_ of his judgment, and the rigid _impartiality_ of his inquiries after truth, who can peril his eternal prospects on the mere fact that he _disbelieves_ these doctrines, whether they be _true_ or _false!_ Suppose that disbelief may diminish the intensity of his fears, can it alter the real state of the case, or remove the only just ground of apprehension and anxiety in regard to the future?
The truth of these doctrines is not dependent either on our belief or disbelief; and in the way of _natural consequence_, even were there no additional penal infliction, they may vindicate themselves hereafter in the case of those who neglect or disbelieve them here, by leaving them destitute of all the advantages which flow only from the cordial reception of the truth.

Thus much at least would be in entire accordance with the analogy of our experience with reference to the interests of the present life; for we do suffer, even now and here, in consequence of our ignorance, or neglect, or practical disbelief of truth,--and it may be so hereafter, in the way simply of inevitable natural consequence, but much more in the way of righteous penal retribution, if there be any truth in that _philosophy of unbelief_, so true to nature and so solemnly proclaimed, "This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil; for every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, _lest his deeds should be reproved_."[318] * * * * * We have endeavored to estimate the claims of Secularism, and to examine the foundations on which it rests.

In doing so, we have not denied either the right or the duty of any man to inquire and to decide for himself on his own solemn responsibility.

We admit as fully as Mr.
Holyoake himself, that personal responsibility implies the right, or rather the duty, of inquiry.