The subsequent halt, imperative as it was for the reasons stated, gave the Boers breathing time in which to recover themselves.

Advance in force by the British main body was not resumed until May 2, but detachments were moved about in various directions on the near front, and on flank and rear, to occupy necessary outposts, to secure the communications, and to insure quiet among the inhabitants.

During this prolonged period of recuperation and preparation the enemy resumed activity, scouring the country with their mounted men, seeking to cut off exposed parties, and by menacing the communications, to embarrass and retard the British commander in his new arrangements.

In the first of these measures the Boers attained some successes; but in the second, either their numbers were too few for their object, or their habitual caution prevented {p.313} resort to action in such force and at such risk as is absolutely necessary either seriously to "interrupt" communications--in the military sense of the phrase--or to produce any deterrent impression upon a commander of the experience and sound judgment of the one with whom they were dealing.

Not only did they not materially threaten the communications, but it was perfectly evident that, whatever their reasons, they dared not attempt to do so.
As regards the cutting off of British detachments, of which the affairs of Reddersburg and of Koorn Spruit, near Thaba Nchu, were the most conspicuous illustrations, the only thing essential to be remarked is that such reverses on a small scale are always to be expected in war, in even the most successful campaigns.