He now asserted that, "as the Chief Executive under the Constitution of the United States," he had no alternative but "to collect the public revenues, and to protect the public property, so far as this might be practicable under existing laws." Remarking that his province "was to execute, and not to make, the laws," he threw upon Congress the duty "of enlarging their provisions to meet exigencies as they may occur." He declared it as his own conviction that "the right and the duty to use military force defensively against those who resist the federal officers in the execution of their legal functions, and against those who assail the property of the Federal Government, are clear and undeniable." Conceding so much, the mild denial which the President re-asserted, of "the right to make aggressive war upon any State," may be charitably tolerated; for, under the defensive power which he so broadly approved, the whole force of national authority could be used against a State aggressively bent upon Secession.
The President did not fail to fortify his own position at every point with great force.

The situation had become so serious, and had "assumed such vast and alarming proportions, as to place the subject entirely above and beyond Executive control." He therefore commended "the question, in all its various bearings, to Congress, as the only tribunal possessing the power to meet the existing exigency." He reminded Congress that "to them belongs exclusively the power to declare war, or to authorize the employment of military force in all cases contemplated by the Constitution." Not abandoning the hope of an amicable adjustment, the President pertinently informed Congress that "they alone possess the power to remove grievances which might lead to war, and to secure peace and union." As a basis of settlement, he recommended a formal compromise by which "the North shall have exclusive control of the territory above a certain line, and Southern institutions shall have protection below that line." This plan, he believed, "ought to receive universal approbation." He maintained that on Congress, and "on Congress alone, rests the responsibility." As Congress would certainly in a few days be under the control of the Republicans in both branches,--by the withdrawal of senators and representatives from the seceding States,--Mr.Buchanan's argument had a double force.

Not only was he vindicating the position of the Executive and throwing the weight of responsibility on the Legislative Department of the government, but he was protecting the position of the Democratic party by saying, in effect, that the President chosen by that party stood ready to approve and to execute any laws for the protection of the government and the safety of the Union which a Republican Congress might enact.
A certain significance attached to the date which the President had selected for communicating his message to Congress.

It was the eighth day of January, the anniversary of the Battle of New Orleans, celebrated that year with enthusiastic demonstrations in honor of the memory of Andrew Jackson, who had, on a memorable occasion not unlike the present, sworn an emphatic oath that "the Federal Union must and shall be preserved." There was also marked satisfaction throughout the loyal States with Mr.Buchanan's assurance of the peace of the District of Columbia on the ensuing 4th of March, on the occasion of Mr.Lincoln's inauguration.

He did not himself "share in the serious apprehensions that were entertained of disturbance" on that occasion, but he made this declaration, which was received in the North with hearty applause: "In any event, it will be my duty to preserve the peace, and this duty shall be performed." The change of sentiment towards Mr.Buchanan after the delivery of the special message, was as marked in the North as it was in the South, though in the opposite direction.